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NOTES
DEMANDING DUE PROCESS: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE § 524 CHANNELING
INJUNCTION AND TRUST MECHANISMS THAT




In 1982, the actions of one corporation dramatically changed
both tort and bankruptcy law. In that year, the Johns-Manville Corpo-
ration (Manville) was facing an onslaught of asbestos-related injury
suits and saw no traditional legal device to both defend against all the
tort claims and keep the company afloat. Manville had creative law-
yers who persuaded the company to make an unprecedented move:
file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Manville's decision "sent shock waves
though the legal community" both because Manville was solvent at the
time it filed and because all the asbestos claims against the company
were consolidated into one proceeding, including both those that had
already been filed and those that had yet to arise.1
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.A., Politics,
University of Dallas, 2002. I would like to thank Adjunct Professor Daniel Murray, who
is also a partner at the Chicago office of Jenner & Block, L.L.P., for his class on
Corporate Reorganization and Professor Jay Tidmarsh for his class on Complex Civil
Litigation.
1 JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVER-
SARY SYSTEM 702-03 (1998).
Part of the shock resulted from the fact that Johns-Manville was still solvent.
The other part resulted from the way in which Johns-Manville proposed to
use bankruptcy: to consolidate both present and future asbestos claims
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More than twenty years later, Manville's solution remains an im-
portant subject of study because corporations continue to struggle to
deal with asbestos claims and remain profit-making entities. Also,
companies are turning to a new tool, the "pre-packaged" plan of reor-
ganization, which is modeled after Manville's trust solution but negoti-
ated and settled before bankruptcy is filed.2 A 2002 RAND Institute
for Civil Justice report estimated that since Manville's bankruptc,
more than sixty asbestos companies have declared bankruptcy, and
over twenty of those occurred between 2000 and 2002.3 That the
problem is not lessening can be seen in the rise in the number of
claims against the Manville Trust. In 2001, over 90,000 claims were
filed, "more than in any prior year and nearly six times the total num-
ber of claims pending against Manville when it declared bankruptcy
twenty years before. '4 Also, more asbestos claims are being filed in
courts. One proposed asbestos reform bill in the Senate notes among
its findings that "the extraordinary volume of nonmalignant asbestos
cases continues to strain Federal and State courts, with over 200,000
cases pending and over 50,000 new cases filed each year."5 The num-
ber of new claims filed may not decrease for many years to come; past
exposures will "result in significant death and disability from mesothe-
lioma and other cancers well into the 21st century."6 This onslaught
of claims explains why so many companies have opted to follow
Manville's example and file bankruptcy. Manville's mark on asbestos
litigation has been profound and continues to be of interest today.
The purpose of Chapter 11 reorganization is to allow a failing
company to resolve its debts and emerge with equity and a clean slate.
Although Manville was solvent when it filed, it knew with relative cer-
tainty it could not survive prolonged litigation and paying out all the
within the proceeding, and to emerge from the Chapter 11 reorganization
intact, healthy, and claim-free.
Id.
2 See In re ACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004); Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. (2004) (written statement of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N.
Cardozo Sch. of Law of Yeshiva Univ.) [hereinafter Hearing].
3 HON. NATHANIEL R. JONES, CHAIR, A.B.A. COMM'N ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION 10 (2003) (quoting STEPHEN J. CAR-
ROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVILJUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSA-
TION: AN INTERIM REPORT 7 (2002), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/
DB/DB397), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/full-report.pdf.
4 Id. at9.
5 Asbestos Claims Criteria and Compensation Act of 2003, S. 413, 108th Cong.
§ 2(a) (9).
6 Id. § 2(a)(5).
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asbestos claims. After reorganization, pre-petition creditors, includ-
ing asbestos-related tort claimants, can no longer bring claims against
a company, because "[u]nless [the tort] claims can be discharged...
corporate defendants would emerge at the other end of reorganiza-
tion with another crushing queue of claims, and would have no incen-
tive to seek bankruptcy protection."' 7 A company has no reason to go
through bankruptcy unless it will reemerge with some equity and a
reasonable probability of success as a profit-making entity.
Since Manville's historic bankruptcy filing, many other compa-
nies facing asbestos claims have followed Manville's example. The
companies and the courts saw that Manville had finally found a way to
manage the thousands of asbestos claims clogging the legal system. In
2001, the RAND Institute for Civil Justice estimated that 500,000 as-
bestos claims had been filed against numerous defendants and that
the value of each claim ranged between $500,000 and $2.5 million. 8
The RAND Institute also predicted the total economic cost of asbestos
claims may eventually reach $265 billion,9 "more than cost estimates
for all Superfund cleanup sites combined, Hurricane Andrew, or the
September l1th terrorist attacks." 10 Faced with these grim realities,
more companies facing asbestos claims-such as North American
Refractories Company (NARCO), Kaiser Aluminum, A.P. Green,
Harbison-Walker, and Shook & Fletcher in 2002 11-have opted for
bankruptcy.
Reorganization does not solely benefit the corporation as a way to
continue as a going concern; asbestos victims themselves also benefit
when their claims are dealt with in a manner more efficient than the
alternatives the current legal system can provide. A United States Ju-
dicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos (Ad Hoc Commit-
tee) appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1991 reported that the
asbestos tort crisis is a "disaster of major proportions to both the vic-
tims and the producers of asbestos products, which the courts are ill-
7 JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION: PROBLEMS IN AD-
VANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 194 (2002).
8 Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos Litigation and Judicial Leadership: The Courts'Duty to Help
Solve the Asbestos Litigation Crisis, BRIEFLY ... PERSP. ON LEGIS., REG., AND LITIG., June
2002, at 1, 7 (citing DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVILJUSTICE, ASBESTOS
LITIGATION IN THE U.S.: A NEW LOOK AT AN OLD ISSUE 12 (2001)).
9 STEPHENJ. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIWLJUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION
COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT 77 (2002) [hereinafter RAND RE-
PORT], available at http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB397/DB397.pdf.
10 Bell, supra note 8, at 8.
11 Id.
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equipped to meet effectively."12 The courts cannot aggregate all the
asbestos claims and render judgments efficiently; each case takes too
long to litigate and there are too many cases. Furthermore, the costs
of litigating for both the plaintiffs and defendants are prohibitive.
The Ad Hoc Committee argued that "U]ustice is denied because
claims cannot be evaluated and either dismissed, paid, or litigated in a
reasonable time frame. Unfairness results because of the excessive
transaction costs and the finite resources available to pay meritorious
claims."13 The Ad Hoc Committee also pointed out that with
thousands of asbestos claims clogging the system, the rest of the
courts' dockets were also delayed. 14 Giving each asbestos plaintiff his
own "day in court" contributed to the judicial crisis. Thus, reorganiza-
tion has been accepted as a mechanism to provide more plaintiffs with
some compensation more quickly and reduce the overall drain on the
judicial system.
One might reasonably ask at this point why a company that may
be responsible for the injuries and deaths of thousands of people
should be allowed to continue as a going concern. First, most of the
asbestos manufacturers responsible are already bankrupt; those com-
panies currently facing lawsuits are part of a "second wave" of asbestos
claims targeted at those who innocently distributed or used asbestos
unaware of the danger involved.15 Second, even if a company did
know asbestos was harmful, the policy behind Chapter 11 bankruptcy
is to "prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant
loss ofjobs and possible misuse of economic resources."' 6 Company
liquidation is also costly to society because it results in "increased un-
employment insurance payments, increased use of other social welfare
programs, and decreased tax revenues."1 7 The ABA discusses a report
commissioned by the American Insurance Association that estimates
12 An Hoc COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIG., JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE An Hoc COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2 (1991).
13 Id. at 14.
14 Id. at 26 (stating that the asbestos claims are "imped[ing] the resolution of
other cases in the justice system").
15 Bell, supra note 8, at 29 (listing examples of those involved in the "new wave"
of litigation, including "distributors who sold the products as middlemen between
manufacturers and contractors .... automobile manufacturers, telephone compa-
nies, computer makers .... consumer product retailers and even food and wine mak-
ers"); see also Asbestos Claim Criteria and Compensation Act of 2003, S. 413, 108th
Cong. § 2(a) (8) (stating that the current asbestos litigation involves "defendant com-
panies that were never involved in the production of asbestos").
16 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).




that as of 2003, approximately 60,000 workers have lost their jobs as a
result of corporate bankruptcies due to asbestos litigation.' 8 The ABA
notes that the RAND Institute's estimate is twice that at 128,000.19
Further, "'[e]ach displaced worker ... will lose, on average, an esti-
mated $25,000 to $50,000 in wages over his or her career' and will
suffer "'roughly $8,300 in pension losses, which represent[s], on aver-
age, a roughly twenty-five percent reduction in the value of the 401 (k)
account."' 20 Each employee, creditor, and owner loses either her job
or the money rightly due to her, or both. 21 The workers may be able
to find other employment, if jobs have not gone overseas, but proba-
bly not quickly or without cost (both economic and emotional).22
Thus, reorganization under Chapter 11 is socially desirable because it
benefits the company, the employees, and the economy and does not
bleed a company dry.
Congress endorsed Manville's creative approach to the asbestos
tort problem by amending the Bankruptcy Code (Code) in 1994 and
adding § 52 4 (g) and (h), which includes the channeling injunction
and trust mechanisms Manville employed to effectively discharge the
asbestos claims during the reorganization. Although all of the play-
ers-including the victims, companies, and society in general-in-
volved in reorganization receive tangible benefits in terms of
efficiency, § 524 (g) and (h) must still pass constitutional muster. Part
I of this Note presents the particular difficulties with including "future
claimants" in the reorganization. Part II describes the solution
Manville introduced and how the revised Code incorporates
Manville's procedures. Part III then asks whether § 52 4 (g) and (h) is
constitutionally sound, focusing primarily on procedural due process
as fundamentally problematic. Part IV shifts the analysis from an ex-
amination of the due process rights of asbestos victims to the inade-
quate protection of the due process rights of the companies. An
argument in support of more stringent medical criteria to prove in-
jury is made in Part V. This Note concludes that § 524(g) and (h) is
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, and Congress must
find another solution to the mass asbestos tort problem.
18 JONES, supra note 3, at 10 (citingJOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., AM. INS. ASS'N, THE
IMPACT OF ASBESTOS LIABILITIES ON WORKERS IN BANKRUPT FIRMS 3 (2002), available at
http://www.heartland.org/pdf/11543.pdf).
19 Id.
20 Id. (quotingJOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., AM. INS. ASS'N, THE IMPACT OF ASBESTOS
LIABILITIES ON WORKERS IN BANKRuPT FIRMs 3 (2002), available at http://www.heart
land.org/pdf/1 1543.pdf).
21 SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 17, at 2.
22 Id.
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I. FUTURE CLAIMANTS IN REORGANIZATION
Asbestos litigation presents a unique problem for companies be-
cause of the nature of the injuries caused by exposure to asbestos and
the popularity of the product. These two factors have generated a
constant stream of thousands of asbestos claims brought in courts
across the country. Working with or around asbestos causes a variety
of respiratory ailments and some forms of lung cancer that may have
an extremely long latency period, sometimes up to forty years after
exposure.23 Those who have tort claims against companies may not
know it for many years. Because asbestos was an extremely useful and
popular product, millions of people have been exposed-asbestos was
widely used in buildings from power plants to schools. Even through
the late 1970s and early 1980s companies continued to use asbestos
products. Manville found a unique way to deal with all of these claims
and remain a viable company: reorganization through Chapter 11, re-
sulting in the discharge of all the creditor claims against it, including
those of present and future asbestos victims.
Chapter 11 bankruptcy discharges all the claims against the
debtor, allowing the debtor to emerge free and clear. As indicated
earlier, "[t]o be a completely effective aggregation device, bankruptcy
must be able to aggregate the claims of all potential plaintiffs. ' 24 The
"typical" creditor against a debtor is easy to identify-the creditor may
be a company owed money for goods or services or a bank with a lien
on a company building. Even in most mass torts, such as an airplane
crash, the victims are readily identifiable because the debtor knows
exactly how many victims are involved and the victims have visible in-
juries or have died. However, in "latent-injury toxic tort cases," such
as those involving asbestos, the victims may not know immediately that
they have been injured and have a claim to make against the debtor. 25
The problem is that the Code "was not drafted with persons holding
later-occurring debts in mind, and there is no easy textual way for the
court sitting in bankruptcy to bring these persons into the proceeding
or to discharge these later-occurring debts."26 Therefore, before
§ 524(g) and (h) was added in 1994, courts had to creatively find ways
to include future claimants in the bankruptcy proceeding and dis-
charge their claims against the debtor.
Several steps in Chapter 11 reorganization are problematic for
future claimants. The highlights of the reorganization process are as
23 Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988).





follows. The first step in Chapter 11 bankruptcy is to file a plan of
reorganization. 27 Under § 1122, the creditors are then organized
within classes of those who have substantially similar claims. 28 The
reorganization plan requires acceptance by only the "impaired clas-
ses." 29 Acceptance is acknowledged by the court when "at least two-
thirds in amount and more than one-half in number" of the creditors
vote to accept the plan. 3° Those who do not have claims but instead
have "interests" are also placed into classes, but acceptance only re-
quires two-thirds in dollar amount of their interest in the company.
31
If the plan of reorganization is approved and then confirmed by the
court, the plan binds all the creditors, whether they voted for the plan
or not.32 The debtor is also vested with all of "the property [of the
estate] . . . free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors" ex-
cept as otherwise provided for by the plan.33 Most importantly for
future claimants, "the confirmation of a plan discharges the debtor
from any debt that arose" before the confirmation.
34
Troublesome procedural due process issues become apparent
when future claimants are incorporated into the Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation process. How does the debtor notify those that do not know
they have an injury related to the bankruptcy? Should the court put
the future claimants in the same class as the present claimants? How
will the interests of future claimants be represented during reorgani-
zation? How does the court ensure future claimants' participation in
the voting process so they are not disadvantaged compared to the pre-
sent claimants and other creditors?
The procedures used in other non-latent injury tort situations
such as airline crashes or other disasters where the victims are identifi-
able and their injuries are immediately apparent do not lend them-
selves easily to application in the asbestos context. For example, to
deal with the uncertain value of the claims in cases where there are
only a few tort victims, "it is usually easiest to try these claims as part of
the bankruptcy proceedings; then their value is established to a cer-
27 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2000).
28 Id. § 1122.
29 Id. § 1124 (defining impaired claims and interests as belonging to those hold-
ers whose legal, equitable, or contractual rights have been altered or who have not
received compensation).
30 Id. § 1126(c).
31 Id. § 1126(d).
32 Id. § 1141 (a).
33 Id. § 1141(c).
34 Id. § 1141 (d) (1)(A).
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tainty."3 5 However, with asbestos litigation, even if the identity of fu-
ture claimants is known, it is impossible for the court to try each of
their cases individually to determine the value of their damages claims
given that literally thousands and thousands, perhaps even millions, of
individuals might be claimants.3 6 To deal with this situation, the Code
states that the total number and value of claims will be estimated.37
However, in the context of asbestos, an accurate estimation of the lia-
bility of a given debtor is impossible given the temporal and geo-
graphic dispersion of the victims, as well as the uncertainty as to which
injuries, if any, manifest. As will be discussed more fully below, the
remedies the Code provides are inadequate to deal with the unique
problems mass asbestos tort claims present.
II. MANVILLE'S SOLUTION AND ITS ADOPTION BY THE CODE
Judge Jon 0. Newman of the Second Circuit summarized the
conditions that led Manville to file under Chapter 11.38 Manville was
the largest miner and manufacturer of asbestos.3 9 During the 1960s
to 1970s the products liability suits began mounting against Manville
so that by the early 1980s approximately 16,000 claimants had filed
12,500 suits. 40 The suits were coming in at a rate of 425 per month,
and studies suggested that a total of 50,000 to 100,000 suits could still
be filed. 41 The bankruptcy court noted that "[o]n the basis of these
studies and the costs Manville had already experienced in disposing of
prior claims, Manville estimated its potential liability at approximately
$2 billion."42 Although Manville was not currently insolvent, it faced
interminable litigation and knew its resources would not survive.
Chapter 11 provided a viable way to deal with the claims and still con-
tinue as a company.43 During its reorganization, Manville employed a
three-part method to effectively deal with the future claims: catego-
35 TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 1, at 715.
36 Id. ("In complex mass torts, however, trying each case to establish a precise
value for each tort claim would take decades, would deprive everyone of a remedy
until the last case was tried, and might consume all of the resources of the debtor.").
37 11 U.S.C. § 502.





43 See DAVID L. BUCHBINDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRuTcy. A LAWYER'S GUIDE
457-58 (1991) ("The goal of a Chapter 11 proceeding is to obtain confirmation of a
Chapter 11 reorganization plan that will satisfy creditors while retaining assets or con-
tinuing the debtor's business.").
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rizing the future claims more appropriately as "interests," issuing a
channeling injunction effectively discharging the interests against the
reorganized Manville, and creating a trust that would take care of all
the asbestos claims as they arose post-petition.
The first problem the bankruptcy court faced in Manville's reor-
ganization was deciding whether the future claimants really had
"claims" at all. The court resolved the problem by characterizing their
claims as "interests," which meant that they should be involved in the
reorganization process but did not have an actual "claim" as defined
under the Code.44 This definitional problem is significant because
only "claims" can be discharged with Chapter 11 reorganization. Al-
though the term "claim" is defined broadly by the Code,45 the bank-
ruptcy court determined that those who have yet to manifest an injury
really only have "interests" in the litigation.
46
The second and third steps in the process were the creation of
the channeling injunction and trust. Because only claims can be dis-
charged, Manville had to find a way to effectively accomplish the same
result for the interests to make reorganization worthwhile. The chan-
neling injunction and trust worked in tandem to accomplish this goal.
The injunction essentially required all future claims be brought not
against Manville, but against a trust established under the plan.47 The
Second Circuit emphasized "the Injunction applies to all health claim-
ants, both present and future, regardless of whether they technically
have dischargeable 'claims' under the Code."48 By ensuring Manville
as a going concern, the trust was the cornerstone of the plan and was
44 Kane, 843 F.2d at 639 ("The Bankruptcy Court. . . reason[ed] that regardless
of whether the future claimants technically had 'claims' cognizable in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings ... they were at least 'parties in interest' under section 1109(b) of the Code
and were therefore entitled to a voice in the proceedings.").
45 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000) ("[A] 'claim' means-right to payment, whether
or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured
46 In reJohns-Manville Corp., 52 B.R. 940, 942 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Both the Third Circuit in [In re] Amatex [Corp., 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir.
1985),] and the bankruptcy court in [In re] UNR [Indus., 46 B.R. 671
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985),] held that future claimants are 'parties in interest'
who deserve to be heard in the reorganization process regardless of whether
they are creditors with dischargeable claims.
Id.
47 Kane, 843 F.2d at 640 ("The Injunction provides that asbestos health claimants
may proceed only against the Trust to satisfy their claims and may not sue Manville, its
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designed to resolve all present and future asbestos claims.49
Manville's three-part solution to the problem of future claimants be-
came the model that was later adopted in the Code and used by many
other companies that found themselves in similar predicaments. 50
In 1994, amendments to the Code implicitly endorsed Manville's
use of the trust and channeling injunction as mechanisms to deal with
the problem of future claimants. The Bankruptcy Reform Act added
§ 524(g) and (h) as the "Manville Amendments" to the Code to nar-
rowly address the problems associated with asbestos claims in reorgan-
ization.51 The amendments refer to the future claims as "demands,"
although the way the Code defines the term also includes present
claims if they were not made during the proceedings. 52 Thus, the
Code avoids the problem that arises in the initial question of whether
future claims are really claims at all. The 1994 amendments created
special rules regarding "demands" that instruct courts on precisely
how to deal with those claimants that possess latent injuries.
The amendments require the debtor's channeling injunction and
trust to meet certain criteria. First, § 5 24 (g) (1) (A) requires notice
and a hearing before a court can issue the injunction in connection
with the confirmation of the plan.5 3 Second, regarding the demands
themselves, the court must determine that the number of future
claims the debtor will face without the injunction is "substantial" and
that all arise out of the same conduct or events; that the precise num-
ber and amount of the claims are indeterminable and temporally dis-
persed; and that the litigation that would arise from dealing with these
claims would "likely threaten" the ability of the debtor to deal equita-
bly with both present and future claimants. 54 Finally, as part of the
proceedings leading to the issuance of the injunction, the court must
appoint a representative for those that might assert demands, and the
injunction itself must deal fairly and equitably with the funds and ben-
efits that will be provided to the trust.55 If all of these requirements
are met, those making demands will be barred from ever instituting
49 Id.
50 Fourteen of the approximately seventy companies that have filed for bank-
ruptcy since Manville have established trusts. Hearing, supra note 2, at 19 (written
statement of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law of
Yeshiva Univ.).
51 Dean M. Trafelet et al., Section 5 2 4(g) and the Futures Representative, in COMM. ON
CONTINUING EDUC., ALI-ABA, ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 53, 53
(2002).
52 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(5) (2000).
53 Id. § 524(g)(1)(A).
54 Id. § 524(g) (2) (B) (ii).
55 Id. § 524(g)(4)(B).
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proceedings against the debtor's successor, and the debtor is indemni-
fied from any future claims.56 Section 524(h) extends the legitimacy
of such injunctions to those that have previously been issued, refer-
ring to Manville's injunction, provided the legal representative of the
future claimants did not object to the formation of the trust and issu-
ance of the channeling injunction.57
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF § 5 24 (g) AND (h)
Many practical and constitutional problems are implicated by the
channeling injunction and trust mechanisms. The strongest argu-
ment against constitutionality arises under the Fifth Amendment's re-
quirement of procedural due process. Due process is an amorphous
concept, taking on different meanings depending on the context. 58
The fuzzy definitions of due process result from the fact that the Fifth
Amendment does not define the term. 59 However, the heart of due
process seems to be notice of a proceeding and the opportunity to be
heard-to have one's day in court so to speak-before one's property,
or in the context of a criminal case, one's liberty or life, can be af-
fected or taken away.60 Therefore, due process usually requires that
only those party to a case can be bound by the decision in that case.61
There are two exceptions to this rule: class actions and bankruptcy.62
However, the constitutionally-guaranteed right to due process must
still be met, and thus the inquiry focuses on the adequacy of notice
and representation for claimants.
Other issues may be problematic as well, either practically or con-
stitutionally. These arise more generally in mass tort litigation and
would equally apply in the discharge of demands during bankruptcy.
For example, an argument could be made that future claimants do
56 Id. § 524(g)(3)(A).
57 Id. § 524(h).
58 TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 7, at 2.
59 U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating generally that "[n]o person shall be . . . de-
prived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law").
60 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("An
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is
to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated ... to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.").
61 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 759 (1989) ("[T]he general rule [is] that a per-
son cannot be deprived of his legal rights in a proceeding to which he is not a
party."); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) ("[O]ne is not bound by a judg-
ment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which
he has not been made a party by service of process.").
62 Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762 n.2.
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not have standing because they do not yet have a case or controversy.
The argument ultimately fails by analogizing to the standing recog-
nized for a person afraid of injury who seeks a remedy in the form of
an injunction. Likewise, a future claimant has a legitimate claim and
must be provided an opportunity to meaningfully participate in plan
formation. Also, Jay Tidmarsh and Roger H. Trangsrud list, among
other issues, the requirement for adversarial procedure, 63 "the guar-
antee that the adjudicator will use reason.., to arrive atjudgments,"
64
and a "preference for the use of procedures that minimize the sum of
litigation costs and error costs." 65 The Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial, the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, and substantive due
process rights may also be implicated by the discharge of demands.
Ralph R. Mabey andJamie Andra Gavrin satisfactorily argue § 524(g)
and (h) is constitutional under the Takings Clause as well under the
substantive requirements of due process.66 However, Mabey and
Gavrin's argument on procedural due process is not persuasive, as will
be discussed below. And while the Seventh Amendment jury trial
right and the issues Tidmarsh and Trangsrud raise are important and
interesting arguments, in dealing specifically with demands as op-
posed to both present and future claimants, the real constitutional
problem seems to be with notice and adequate representation (which
incorporates their point about the need to follow adversarial proce-
dure).67 Therefore, this Note will focus on the procedural due pro-
cess issues.
Because a Chapter 11 filing discharges all debts owed to creditors
whether they are party to the proceeding or not, due process requires
(1) that the debtor provide reasonable notice to the potential claim-
ants of the bankruptcy and the bar date for filing claims against the
debtor's estate68 and (2) that the claimants participate in the proceed-
ings by voting for the plan of reorganization and having adequate rep-
resentation. These procedural due process requirements are also the
first statutory requirements under § 524(g), as discussed above. 69 At
63 TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 7, at 2-3 (citing Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40).
64 Id. (citing In rejapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir.
1980)).
65 Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
66 Ralph R. Mabey &Jamie Andra Gavrin, Constitutional Limitations on the Discharge
of Future Claims in Bankruptcy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 745, 762-75 (1993) (arguing that future
claims are not property under the Takings Clause and that future claims are not fun-
damental rights that qualify for heightened constitutional protection).
67 See discussion infra Part IIA-B.
68 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000) (stating when claims are allowed).
69 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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first glance, the inclusion of these requirements seems to make the
1994 amendments pass muster under the Fifth Amendment. How-
ever, the procedural requirements are fundamentally unconstitutional
because they fail to protect the rights of demand-holders who cannot
receive adequate notice, vote, or otherwise have a meaningful oppor-
tunity to participate through a representative. For demand-holders,
due process is essential because of the draconian result of reorganiza-
tion for them in particular: complete discharge of their claims, even
though they do not yet know they have claims to make.
A. Notice
Section 524(g) requires the debtor provide "adequate notice" of
the event of filing Chapter 11 to everyone who may have a pre-petition
claim; creditors must have a fair opportunity to file a claim and pro-
vide input in the reorganization process. The notice requirement
gives rise to a glaring problem with regard to demand-holders who by
definition are unaware of their latent injury. Although demand-hold-
ers were exposed to the asbestos pre-petition, the debtor cannot possi-
bly know who all of them might be, nor do the victims themselves
know they have an injury. In contrast, notice is fairly easy to give to
trade creditors-the debtor knows from whom it has borrowed
money, entered a lease with, bought capital from, etc. A debtor has
no way to provide adequate notice to those who will make demands
post-petition.
The argument made in support of the adequacy of the section's
notice requirement focuses on the fact that "publication notice"
(which has been permitted outside the mass tort context), when used
in connection with a future claims representative, should be sufficient
if there is no feasible notice substitute. 70 Mabey and Gavrin argue that
"[t] he procedural process owed to unknown or unidentifiable future
claimants does not include actual notice under all circumstances.
'" 71
Mabey and Gavrin acknowledge due process in respect to future
claimants requires more than publication notice, because the "future
claims as a group are usually in some general sense known and fore-
seeable to the debtor."72 Thus, they argue a legal representative is
70 Mabey & Gavrin, supra note 66, at 779 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), which allowed publication in a newspaper to serve
as notice to unknown trust beneficiaries).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 780.
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required, acknowledging that "publication notice to [future claim-
ants] is largely futile.
73
The problem with Mabey and Gavrin's argument is two-fold.
First, they focus too little on the fact that notice is inherently insuffi-
cient specifically in the context of latent-injury mass tort cases, which is
the subject of § 524(g) and (h). Second, they fail to separate out the
Code's requirements of both notice and a legal representative. Under
the Due Process Clause both requirements must individually be met
for a channeling injunction to bind demand-holders.74 Mabey and
Gavrin do not cite any authority for the proposition that a legal repre-
sentative is adequate to make up for deficiencies in notice. Given the
problems discussed below regarding the legal representative, their ar-
gument is especially troublesome and ultimately unpersuasive.
The fundamental difference between latent-injury and non-la-
tent-injury mass torts is that in non-latent-injury cases, although the
debtor may not know who all the potential claimants are, the victims
themselves would know who they are, given they are presently injured,
and could respond to a publication notice. In latent-injury cases the
victims have no reason to pay attention to such notices-they may not
know that they have been exposed to asbestos, and, if they do, they
currently think they were not injured by it. Even by using scientific
studies, a debtor can do little to determine who the future claimants
might be. Although epidemiologists may be able to predict within a
particular group that a certain number of people will contract a dis-
ease, it is impossible to identify who in the group will be the ones to
contract the disease. 75 Even if a debtor can identify those who will
most likely have asbestos-related injuries, a scientific study would not
be able to reveal which particular disease of many an individual might
later contract or if an individual will ever show symptoms. 76 Thus, the
notice requirement does little to further the policy underlying the
Due Process Clause-ensuring the opportunity to be heard before
one's rights are impaired by a legal proceeding.
73 Id. at 781.
74 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
75 Thomas E. Willging, Mass Torts Problems and Proposals: A Report to the Mass Torts
Working Group, 187 F.R.D. 328, 345 (1999).
Epidemiologists often are able to predict with reasonable scientific certainty
that some number of individuals within a specified group will contract a dis-
ease because of a previous exposure to a product or substance. We do not
know with certainty which individuals will contract the disease and how





B. Participation in the Process of Reorganization
The Due Process Clause normally mandates that only those made
party to a judicial proceeding can be bound by the outcome. But as
explained above, due process does allow persons to be bound when
notice and a meaningful opportunity to participate are provided.
77
Demand-holders are unable to meaningfully participate in reorganiza-
tion through the process established by § 524(g) and therefore they
cannot constitutionally be bound to a channeling injunction and trust
created by a plan.
1. Voting on the Plan
Approving a plan normally requires the vote of a majority in
number and two-thirds of the value of the claims of each class of im-
paired claimants.78 Under §§ 1124 and 524(g), present claimants vote
on and approve the plan under similar rules; however, the Code does
not contain corresponding voting provisions for demand-holders be-
cause it is impossible to know who they are. The difficulty with the
voting rules is that the demand-holders are in the end disadvantaged
as compared to the present claimants because (1) the demand-hold-
ers are bound to a plan they did not vote on and (2) the present
claimants have more of an opportunity to ensure their interests are
protected under the plan. This inequity is inherent in the nature of
demands and could not be remedied by the Code.
Involving a class of demand-holders in the voting process is prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, in latent-injury mass tort cases, knowing
or even estimating the size of the class of demand-holders is difficult.
The debtor simply does not know with certainty how many people
have been exposed to its asbestos. Thus, for a judge to determine
whether a majority of an indeterminate number of those in the de-
mand class have approved the proposed plan is inherently impossible.
Second, it is similarly impossible for a judge to determine whether
those with two-thirds of the dollar amounts of the demands have ap-
proved the plan. If the court does not know who the victim is, the
court cannot know the value of each victim's demand. Even if the
court did know the identity of all the victims, the nature of future
claimants is that their injuries, and therefore the value of their inju-
ries, are unknown at the time of voting.
The procedures applied by the courts to estimate the value of
present claims are inapplicable to demand-holders. To solve the prac-
77 See discussion supra Part III.A.
78 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2000).
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tical approval problems mentioned above that are also applicable to
present claimants, courts arbitrarily assign a dollar value to each
claim.7 9 Courts then apply the majority and two-thirds rules. The
courts refrain from deciding whether each person has a valid claim
and determining the value of each claim on an individual basis. This
process has generally not been chall*enged because courts believe the
outcome would be the same if "really good" notice and an accurate
examination into the validity of the claimants were given. For exam-
ple, the Second Circuit noted in Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp.8 0 that
because "95.8% of those Class-4 [present claimant] members who
voted approved the Plan, the result would not have been different
unless more than 90% of those who voted in favor had invalid claims,
an improbable circumstance." ' Thus, if one were a betting person,
one would put money on the future claimants approving the plan if it
were possible. The pressure on courts to approve a reorganization
plan seems to encourage them to be lenient in applying the voting
rules.
Leaving aside the question of whether these procedures are pru-
dent for present claimants, the fundamental problem is that this al-
tered voting process, even if wise, could never work for future
claimants. An arbitrary assignment of one dollar to each demand-
holder is meaningless because the number of demand-holders is un-
known. And even if the number were known, the demand-holders
simply do not exist and the court cannot know whether they would
use their one dollar value to vote for or against the plan. Thus, the
fundamental due process problem is that those with latent injuries do
not have the same meaningful opportunity to participate in the plan
approval process as do all the other creditors, and yet the demand-
holders are ultimately bound by the plan, resulting in the discharge of
their claims. The victims are precluded from ever bringing a suit
against the debtor seeking compensation for their injuries.
2. The Future Claims Representative
The second part of the "opportunity to be heard and participate"
requirement of procedural due process is the right to participate in
the proceedings or, if impossible, such as in the context of a class
action or bankruptcy, to have a zealous advocate to represent one's
79 Stuart M. Bernstein, Mass Torts and Bankruptcy, LITIG., Fall 1997, at 5, 66 (dis-
cussing the problems inherent with resolving future claims during reorganization, in-
cluding the difficulty in estimating the value of claims).
80 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
81 Id. at 647.
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interests as a minimal protection during the reorganization process.
As discussed above, Manville recognized that future claimants did not
have "claims" per se, but they did have interests that required the ap-
pointment of a "future claims representative" (or "legal representa-
tive") to negotiate on their behalf during the creation of the plan.
8 2
Accordingly, the bankruptcy judge empowered the legal representa-
tive "'to exercise the powers and perform the duties of a Committee
under Section 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code subject to the reduction
or enlargement of such powers and duties by order of this court.' "83
Thus, the legal representative could meet with the trustee or debtor
about the case,84 investigate the financial situation of the debtor and
any other business matters relevant to formulating a plan,8 5 actively
participate in the creation of the plan,8 6 request the appointment of a
trustee,8 7 and perform any other such services as required by the in-
terests represented. 8 Theoretically, the legal representative was en-
dowed with sufficient power to vigorously represent the future
claimants' interests.
Following Manville's lead, § 52 4 (g) requires not only notice but
that the demand-holders have "adequate" representation during the
reorganization process. Although promising in theory, § 52 4 (g) can-
not provide the constitutionally-mandated opportunity to meaning-
fully participate in the proceedings. A legal representative is by
nature unable to provide the adequate protection that parties in inter-
est require in an adversarial system. The qualitative examples seen in
Manville during the negotiation of the plan and, most troublesome,
after the plan was implemented, together with normative arguments,
illustrate that § 524(g) does not provide adequate procedural safe-
guards through the representative vehicle.
To be constitutional, the Code would have to more specifically
detail the "adequacy of representation" requirement stated in Han-
sbeny v. Lee,89 which dealt with the representation of classes in class
action law suits. Hansbeny held that the Due Process Clause does not
allow an individual member of a class to be bound to the decision of
82 In reJohns-Manville Corp., 52 B.R. 940 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
83 Id. at 942 (quoting an unpublished order by Judge Lifland appointing Leon
Silverman as a representative for future claimants).
84 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (2000).
85 Id. § 1103(c)(2).
86 Id. § 1103(c)(3).
87 Id. § 1103(c) (4).
88 Id. § 1103(c) (5).
89 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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the case unless his or her interests are adequately represented.90 The
Court carved out an exception and stated that "members of a class not
present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment
where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are pre-
sent."91 However, the exception is limited to situations where the rep-
resentative has the same or "substantially the same" interests as those
he represents. 92 The future claims representative in Manville was not
exposed to asbestos and had no interest in ensuring that the future
claimants received the highest damages award possible, as will be dis-
cussed more fully below. Thus, applying the Hansberry class action
representative "adequate representation" test to the context of the fu-
ture claimants, § 5 24 (g) does not protect demand-holders' due pro-
cess rights.
Furthermore, even if the Hansberry hurdle could be overcome, it
is not clear that all the future claimants can be lumped into one single
class of victims for which one legal representative is sufficient.
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, which also involved a class action and
is relevant by analogy, requires that the members of the class have
predominately the same interests. 93 Thus, mesothelioma victims,
whose disease is fatal, should not have the same representative as as-
bestosis victims, who are usually medically unimpaired. Although this
is a specific requirement of Rule 2394 for class actions, the members of
a class for purposes of reorganization should also have predominately
the same interests. The purpose behind Rule 23 is to recognize the
importance of each individual's interest in controlling and directing
his or her own litigation and in not being bound by the litigation deci-
sions of those with different interests.95 The demand-holders are
(presumably) a very diverse group-they will contract diseases of vary-
ing degrees of seriousness (or contract no diseases at all), require dif-
ferent amounts in damages as compensation, and contract their
diseases at different times (thus, some may have no interest in a
highly-funded trust if their injuries will manifest early on). Therefore,
it is not clear that all the future claimants can be fairly represented as
one bulging group.
90 Id. at 41-42.
91 Id. at 42-43.
92 Id. at 45.
93 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
94 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) (requiring representatives to have "claims or defenses...
typical of the claims or defenses of the class... and [to] fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class").
95 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 616.
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The empirical evidence in Manville demonstrates the legal repre-
sentative's inadequacy in advocating the future claimants' interests.
In Manville, the future claims representative's job eroded from being
a zealous advocate to merely being a "go-between" for the debtor and
the other creditors during negotiations about the plan. As Thomas A.
Smith describes, the legal representative "adopted the role of shuttle
diplomat, selling his proposed plan to the various parties separately.
He apparently saw his role not as the intransigent defender of future
claimants, but as the honest broker among constituencies."9
6 The
fundamental defect in the appointment of the legal representative is
that he or she has no identifiable client to answer to or advocate for;
no one meaningfully monitors his or her performance. 97 In fact, the
present claimants in Manville were concerned that the legal represen-
tative was selling them out to the equity holders rather than to the
future claimants. 98 In an adversarial system, how can one confidently
assert that the future claimants had an opportunity to meaningfully
participate through the vehicle of a legal representative who was not
even considered a threat by the other parties?
Predictably, the resulting Manville Trust did not adequately pro-
vide for the needs of the future claimants. The most troubling evi-
dence of the inadequacy of the representative is the fact that the
Manville Trust was grossly underfunded and ran out of money only
two years after the reorganization. Smith points out that "[t]he ulti-
mate result.., was a division of the debtor's value between present
claimants and equity holders that left future claimants almost entirely
unprovided for, as the protections of future claimants in the plan
proved completely ineffective." 99 The Manville Trust settled claims as
they came in for their full amount plus a thirty percent contingency
fee. The result was a truly inequitable situation in which the present
claimants and those future claimants who discovered their injuries
early were fully compensated while those who did not manifest inju-
ries until much later did not receive any money.
The legal representative did not ensure adequate estimates were
made about how many future claims might be filed or the extent of
the damages required to compensate for the injuries. Judge
Weinstein noted: "[W]ithin its first two years of operation the Trust
faced almost 50% more claims than the highest projection made
96 Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YAE
L.J. 367, 390 (1994).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 391.
2005] 1205
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
at the time of confirmation for the total number of claims to be
filed during the entire 1fe of the Trust."' 00 The average claim was
$42,128, much higher than the estimated amount of $25,000 per
claim. 10 1 Judge Weinstein appointed a special master to investigate
the matter, and the special master found the Trust's assets were worth
"between $2.1 and $2.7 billion" but that the claims were estimated to
be about $6.5 billion. 0 2 In the end, eight years after the confirmation
of the plan, Judge Weinstein affirmed the channeling injunction and
approved a settlement that had the Trust pay victims ten percent of a
settlement value established by standardized "scheduled values" rang-
ing from $12,000 to $200,000 depending on the claimant's disease. 10 3
The original estimates were probably inaccurate because "l[t] he more
complex the methodology of estimation, the more opportunities in-
terested parties have to influence the outcome."' 0 4 Those with imme-
diate injuries probably did what they could to ensure more money was
reserved to pay their claims. The influences of the present claimants
and the debtor were probably easy to disguise in the complex estima-
tions, passing right under the eyes of the legal representative who had
no reason to be particularly diligent. Today, the Manville Trust is pay-
ing only five cents for every dollar a claim deserves.' 0 5 The estimates
were so inaccurate and left the claims so far underpaid that one must
conclude the future claims representative was far from an "adequate"
zealous advocate. Although the substantive outcome in Manville does
not prove that the procedure was unconstitutional, the outcome does
indicate that perhaps there was a fundamental problem with the pro-
cedures. My argument is that the underlying problems are constitu-
tional in nature.
The future claims representative's inadequacy is not a problem
explained away as unique to Manville's reorganization; normative ar-
guments also prove § 5 24 (g) is inherently flawed because a future
claims representative, by nature and situation, can never be "ade-
quate." None of the other parties involved in reorganization have an
incentive to support future claimants, including the court, which is
100 In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 758 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. &
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), and modified on reh'g, 993
F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
101 Id.
102 In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 727 (2d Cir. 1992).
103 In rejoint E. & S, Dists. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 495 (E.D.N.Y. &
S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd in part and vacated in unrelated part, 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996),
affd, 100 F.3d 944 (2d Cir. 1996), and affd, 100 F.3d 945 (2d Cir. 1996).
104 Smith, supra note 96, at 384.
105 JONES, supra note 3, at 10.
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the only monitor of the representative's behavior. 10 6 The court's in-
centive is "less to ensure that future claimants receive the maximum
possible or even a fair share, than it is to ensure that the parties reach
some agreement." I0 7 The court is probably more interested in clear-
ing its docket and may appoint an "accommodating" legal representa-
tive. In practice, after notice and a hearing, the court appoints the
legal representative recommended by the trustee, and the court con-
trols the legal representative's duties. 0 8 The other parties in the case
are not going to support the legal representative or the future claim-
ants against the interests of the court. The present claimants, other
creditors, and equity holders all have an interest in undervaluing fu-
ture claims; the less future claimants get, the more money the other
parties get. 109 Moreover, the legal representative is paid out of the
estate and his fees must be approved by the court; thus, there is less
economic incentive to push for more money to go into the settlement
fund than there would be if the representative were paid on a contin-
gent fee basis.' 10 There is also a psychological factor involved in that
the people who have present claims are visible and many (although
not all) have tangible injuries; it is easy to get all the parties to focus
on the present claimants, rather than the future claimants."'
All of these normative factors are not unique to Manville, they are
involved in any reorganization involving asbestos demands. Together
with the added evidence of the outcome of the Manville Trust, one
must conclude § 524(g) is inherently flawed and unconstitutional be-
106 Smith, supra note 96, at 385.
107 Id.
108 In re UNR Indus., Inc., 71 B.R. 467, 477 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) (explaining
that the court has "final decision-making authority" over the expansion of the legal
representative's duties, just as it has authority over the representative's original
appointment).
109 Smith, supra note 96, at 385, 387 (specifically noting that strategically, "[t]o
induce equity holders to consent to a plan, present claimants can offer to agree on a
reorganization plan that divides the value of the firm between present claimants and
equity holders, but leaves little or nothing for future claimants").
110 Id. at 385.
111 Id. at 383-84.
This phenomenon is called the "vividness effect." The vividness effect makes
it difficult for the legal representative of abstract future claimants to per-
suade the court to leave unsatisfied the needs of present claimants so that
future claimants may be treated equally. This psychological factor also dis-
poses a bankruptcy court to underestimate the number and size of future
claims so that the bankruptcy plan can award present claimants something
closer to adequate compensation.
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cause it cannot provide a meaningful way for demand-holders to be
represented and participate in the creation of the plan.
C. Pre-Packaged Reorganization Plans
A more recent phenomenon in bankruptcies resulting from as-
bestos litigation is the "pre-packaged" plan of reorganization using the
channeling injunction and trust mechanisms under § 5 24(g) and
(h). 112 The constitutional difficulties with these plans are the same as
for standard plans of reorganization. But individual treatment of the
pre-packaged plans is warranted due to their recent outgrowth and
the particularly blatant lack of representation for future claimants
during their formation. Procedural due process is denied when fu-
ture claimants are not given a meaningful opportunity to participate.
Professor Lester Brickman submitted a paper to the House Judici-
ary Committee which defined such "pre-packs" as plans "negotiated
between the attorneys for the asbestos claimants and the debtor-to-be
and voted on before the company files its bankruptcy petition."11 3
Pre-packs are intended to "efficiently provide fair compensation.., in
a process which minimizes litigation and transaction costs, expedites
payments to claimants and preserves to the maximum extent possible,
the debtor's business and goodwill."'114 The problem is that the future
claimants are completely left out of the negotiation process and plans
fall very short of providing fair compensation.
As Brickman describes, most of the negotiations for a pre-pack-
aged plan take place in secret among only selected claimants. 115 A
futures representative is not necessarily involved; only those lawyers
that know about the negotiations participate. 116 The problem with
112 Companies that have filed pre-packaged plans include "Shook & Fletcher Insu-
lation Co., J.J. Thorpe Company and Combustion Engineering, Inc ... ACandS,
Western Asbestos Co., Mid-Valley (involving certain Halliburton subsidiaries includ-
ing DII Industries, LLC, formerly Dresser Industries, and Kellogg, Brown and Root),
Utex and the Congoleum Corporation." Hearing, supra note 2, at 28 (written state-
ment of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law of
Yeshiva Univ.).
113 Id. at 27 (written statement of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N.
Cardozo Sch. of Law of Yeshiva Univ.). Professor Brickman provides a description of
such a pre-packaged plan. Id. at 29-31 (written statement of Lester Brickman, Profes-
sor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law of Yeshiva Univ.).
114 Id. at 28 (written statement of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N.
Cardozo Sch. of Law of Yeshiva Univ.).
115 Id. at 32 (written statement of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N.
Cardozo Sch. of Law of Yeshiva Univ.).
116 Id. (written statement of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Car-




disparate treatment of claimants in pre-packaged plans has not been
entirely overlooked. Chief Judge Randall J. Newsome in a 2004 opin-
ion refused to confirm the ACandS pre-packaged plan because of fun-
damental unfairness in the plan's disparate treatment of similar
claimants, i.e., present and future claimants with the same disease who
are differentiated only temporally by when their injuries manifest.
11 7
Judge Newsome noted that ACandS's insurance company was unwill-
ing to provide further coverage unless a pre-packaged plan was cre-
ated and a § 524 channeling injunction issued.118 Negotiations were
held between the insurance company (although it eventually dropped
out), ACandS, and the "prepetition asbestos plaintiffs committee,"
which was composed only of asbestos plaintiffs' attorneys:" 9 Al-
though a futures representative was not involved in these negotiations,
an attorney later representing the future claimants stated that the set-
tlement reached was fair.' 20 Under the settlement, the future claim-
ants were to receive fifty percent of the insurance proceeds recovered
from the insurer, which had already stated its refusal to pay.
121
Judge Newsome did not agree that the treatment of the different
categories of claimants was fair. 122 Judge Newsome found that the
pre-packaged plan did not meet the requirement under § 524(g), stat-
ing that the trust must "'provide reasonable assurance that the trust
will value, and be in a financial position to pay, present claims and
future demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same man-
ner. "123 The plan did not ensure such equal treatment and thus "dis-
criminate [d] between present and future claims.'
12 4
The plan also violated the good faith requirement under
§ 1129 (a) (3), which has been interpreted to require that the plan be
"'proposed with honesty, good intentions and a basis for expecting
that a reorganization can be effected . . . with the most important
feature being . .. the "fundamental fairness" of the plan."' 125 Judge
117 In reACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 42 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004).
118 Id. at 38-39.
119 Id. at 39.
120 Id. at 41 (noting that the futures representative "vouch [ed] for... [the settle-
ment's] fairness"). The futures representative is not listed among the attorneys said
to be involved in the negotiations. Id. at 39.
121 Id. at 39-40.
122 As the Court stated, "[n]otably, members of the prepetition committee appear
prominently in all of the secured categories," which were to receive the bulk of the
payments. Id. at 40.
123 Id. at 42 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2) (B) (ii) (V) (2000)).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 43 (quoting In re Coram Healthcare Corp., 271 B.R. 228, 234 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2001)).
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Newsome concluded that "it is fundamentally unfair that one claimant
with non-symptomatic pleural plaques will be paid in full, while some-
one with mesothelioma runs the substantial risk of receiving nothing.
Both should be compensated based on the nature of their injuries,
not based on the influence and cunning of their lawyers."'126 Judge
Newsome should have gone one step further and held that pre-pack-
aged plans using § 52 4 (g) and (h) are not only fundamentally unfair
in their unequal treatment of claimants but also unconstitutional
under the Due Process Clause.
The Third Circuit in a 2004 decision did recognize the due pro-
cess problems involved in pre-packaged plans. 127 In In re Combustion
Engineering, Inc., Chief Judge AnthonyJ. Scirica, like Judge Newsome,
focused on the fundamental unfairness of the plan but also noted that
the disparate treatment between the present and future claimants im-
plicated due process. 128 Chief Judge Scirica stated: "In the resolution
of future asbestos liability, under bankruptcy or otherwise, future
claimants must be adequately represented throughout the process." 129
Although the opinion did not flesh out the argument sufficiently,
ChiefJudge Scirica did state that the due process problem was created
by the lack of representation and adequate funding of the proposed
trust for future claimants.130
It is inherently impossible to fully correct corruptions like those
exhibited in the ACandS pre-packaged plan, which are evidently run-
of-the-mill.1 31 Just as in standard bankruptcy plans, a futures repre-
sentative is unable to adequately represent clients that she will never
meet and with whom she does not share the same interests.13 2 Also,
future claimants have diverse interests that require more than one
representative. 133 The futures representative, whether in a pre-pack-
126 Id.
127 In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2004).
128 In support of his argument, Chief Judge Scirica cites Amchem and Ortiz v.
FibreBoard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), and also notes that two circuit court cases, Jones
v. Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2000), and Fogelv. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 962
(7th Cir. 2000), have held that "[m]inimal due process rights extend to bankruptcy
proceedings." Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d at 245 & n.64.
129 Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d at 245.
130 Id.
131 Hearing, supra note 2, at 35 (written statement of Lester Brickman, Professor of
Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law of Yeshiva Univ.) (stating that "[i] n pre-packs,
the debtor and the plaintiff lawyer together select a futures representative, arrange
the terms of his compensation and retain the right to hire and fire him").
132 See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
133 See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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aged plan or a standard plan of reorganization, is unable to protect
future claimants' due process rights.
V. DUE PROCESS FOR THE DEBTOR
One important consideration remains. Thus far the focus has
been on the due process owed to the individual demand-holders.
However, one should also consider the due process rights of the
debtor during the reorganization process. Griffin B. Bell argues on
behalf of the debtor in his 2002 article for the National Legal Center
for the Public Interest. 134 Ultimately Bell concludes the bankruptcy
courts should "not displace the tort system as the primary method for
resolving asbestos cases," but he concedes that at present there is not
another available method for companies to deal with mass torts.
135
Bell argues the "most significant casualty of the asbestos litigation
crisis is fairness itself."136 The problem is that plaintiffs' attorneys
have aggregated thousands of asbestos claims into large unwieldy
masses, making it impossible for companies to adequately defend
against their claims by sorting out the sick claimants from those who
many never manifest an injury. 137 An essential part of due process for
defendants is the full and fair opportunity to respond to the claims
asserted against them. 138 The gains in efficiency and ease of disposi-
tion of claims are not advantages to be valued over due process
rights. 139 Preparing an argument requires the chance for discovery
and the time "to obtain information about the other side's claims and
defenses.' 140 During reorganization that opportunity is not given be-
cause, as previously explained, there simply is not enough time for the
judge to make a valuation as to each claimant; even if there were time,
such a valuation would be impossible for demands that have yet to be
brought. Although a scientist may be able to estimate how many peo-
ple will be injured by asbestos in a given population, significant ques-
tions of causation remain.
14'
In the aggregate, the asbestos claims may force a defendant to
settle for more than it would otherwise be willing to. Defendants will
134 Bell, supra note 8.
135 Id. at 4.
136 Id. at 8.
137 Id. at 8-9.
138 See id. at 16 ("The axiom that every litigant has a right to prepare his or her
case adequately seems so basic as to not require any explanation whatsoever.").
139 See id. ("Unfortunately, in many asbestos cases, basic due process rights have
been minimized in the name of resolving cases and clearing court dockets.").
140 Id. at 17.
141 Willging, supra note 75, at 338-39.
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want to just get rid of the claims. Bell argues lawyers go so far as to
advertise for more clients and then use "mass screenings" to deter-
mine if the clients have viable claims.1 42 The RAND Institute cites
several studies that "have found fractions of unimpaired claimants
ranging from two-thirds to up to ninety percent of all current claim-
ants."1 43 With future claims the problem is multiplied because there
is no way to determine if those believed to have been exposed will ever
have problems. The combination of inadequate opportunity to re-
search each claim and the tactics of plaintiffs' attorneys persuades
companies to dump money into a trust and wash their hands of the
situation.
Bell proposes the company's due process rights can be ade-
quately protected by appointing a neutral trustee to analyze each
claim made against the trust;1 44 however, this protective measure does
not seem adequate given that it comes after the creation of the trust.
The amount of money that is to be dedicated to the trust is deter-
mined during reorganization, and at that stage there is no method to
weed out the frivolous claims from the worthy ones. It is impossible to
make an accurate prediction of how many valid future claims will be
made. Thus, how can the company really protect itself against the
creation of large trusts? The company needs to restrain the size of the
trust during the reorganization stage to ensure that the company has
sufficient equity to continue as a going concern. To meet the require-
ments of due process, the opportunity for a full and fair defense
would have to come before the plan is adopted.
However, as a practical matter, most companies probably prefer
to estimate the number of future claims and create the trust, leaving
each individual claim to be examined after reorganization. The com-
pany's only current alternative to the § 5 24 (g) channeling injunction
and trust mechanisms is to allow future claims to be brought against
the successor corporation. When future asbestos claims become pre-
sent claims, they become much stronger, making the possibility of a
very large individual judgment against the company much higher.
The jury, as discussed above, is more sympathetic to a victim sitting in
front of it than a vague concept of future claimants. Thus, companies
142 Bell, supra note 8, at 9.
143 RAND REPORT, supra note 9, at 20 (emphasis added) (noting, however, that
these studies are contested because they "were commissioned by defendants and be-
cause the issue of impairment is central to the asbestos litigation controversy").
144 Bell, supra note 8, at 39 ("The court and trustees are obligated to develop
reliable in-take criteria by which claims are assessed and paid .... Bankruptcy courts
also have the authority to appoint neutral trustees to manage the trust, an important
component of ensuring a fair and just distribution of bankruptcy assets.").
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will avoid the risk of large jury verdicts by using § 524(g) to absolve all
claims, as they have since Manville, and will not point out due process
problems.
V. IN DEFENSE OF A "MEDICAL CRITERIA" LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
The asbestos litigation problem may be solved with a congres-
sional solution that would not only take away the channeling injunc-
tion and trust mechanisms in § 5 24 (g) and (h), but also impose more
stringent medical standards to pare down the number of baseless
claims. Such a legislative solution would alleviate the clog of asbestos
claims in the court system while preserving the due process rights of
future claimants. When future claimants realize that they have been
injured, they will be able to have their day in court. Future claimants
would find the representation they currently lack in the solution pro-
vided by the Code through Congress, just as all citizens do through
any legislation that is passed. A legislative "medical criteria" solution
is the most feasible solution to the problem.
The Supreme Court has recognized its inability to solve the asbes-
tos litigation problem and has asked Congress for a legislative solution
on several occasions. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,145 Justice
Ginsburg lamented the lack of a congressional response despite the
urging of the Judicial Conference to pass legislation. 146 Justice Gins-
burg repeated this need for asbestos legislation in 2003.147 Justice
Souter echoed Justice Ginsburg's view in his oft-quoted opinion in Or-
tiz v. Fibreboard Corp.148 that there is an "elephantine mass of asbestos
cases, and our discussion in Amchem will suffice to show how this litiga-
tion defies customary judicial administration and calls for national leg-
islation."'49 The Chief Justice also supported the call for a legislative
remedy when he stated in his concurrence in Ortiz that the problem
145 521 U.S. 591, 627-28 (1997) (affirming a Third Circuit finding that the named
plaintiffs did not operate "under a proper understanding of their representational
responsibilities" to future claimants under Rule 23).
146 Id. at 597-99.
147 Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 157-59 (2003) (calling for a na-
tional legislative solution and advising courts to refrain from trying to solve the asbes-
tos litigation crisis themselves).
148 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (holding "that applicants for contested certification
... [on a Rule 23 limited fund theory] must show that the fund is limited by more
than the agreement of the parties, and has been allocated to claimants belonging
within the class by a process addressing any conflicting interests of class members").
149 Id. (emphasis added).
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"cries out for a legislative solution.' °5 0 As of yet, however, Congress has
not come to the aid of the courts.
The failure to legislate a solution is not the result of congres-
sional ambivalence to the asbestos litigation problem. On the con-
trary, several bills have been introduced over the years, but all have
failed to gain the needed support.15' Even last year, the 108th Con-
gress discussed asbestos reform. Two dominant legislative proposals
have emerged. The first is the "medical standards" approach spon-
sored by Senator Don Nickles, which is the more simple and workable
solution. 152 The second is the "trust fund" approach sponsored by
Senators Orrin Hatch and William Frist.153 Neither bill passed last
year, but both Democrats and Republicans have expressed a willing-
ness to continue negotiations in future legislative sessions.
Senator Nickles's bill, or the Asbestos Claims Criteria and Com-
pensation Act, effectively limits the number of claims that can be filed
by imposing more stringent medical criteria on potential plaintiffs.
The goal of the bill is "[t]o provide for the fair and efficient judicial
consideration of personal injury and wrongful death claims arising
out of asbestos exposure... [for] individuals who suffer harm, now or
in the future."' 54 The bill seeks to achieve this goal by paring down the
number of claims that can be made to a more manageable number,
thereby negating the need for a company to file for bankruptcy and
preserving funds for those who have bona fide injuries, whether they
arise now or in the future.
The central feature of the "medical criteria" bill is its focus on the
need for a claimant to prove a physical impairment as an essential
element to making a claim, so that frivolous lawsuits are weeded out.
As stated before, studies suggest that as many as ninety percent of new
claims are filed by those who have been exposed to asbestos but are
unimpaired.' 55 Each claimant must make "a prima facie showing of
150 Id. at 865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
151 See discussion infra this Part and notes 153-154.
152 Asbestos Claims Criteria and Compensation Act of 2003, S. 413, 108th Cong. A
similar bill has been sponsored in the House by Representative Chris Cannon. Asbes-
tos Compensation Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1586, 108th Cong.
153 Fairness in Asbestos Resolution Act of 2004, S. 2290, 108th Cong. Likewise, a
similar bill has been sponsored in the House by Representative Mark Steven Kirk.
Asbestos Compensation Act of 2003, H.R. 1114, 108th Cong.
154 S. 413 (emphasis added). The stated purposes of the bill also recognize pro-
tection of the rights of future claimants. Id. § 2(b) (2) (stating that one of the pur-
poses is to "fully preserve the rights of claimants who were exposed to asbestos to
pursue compensation should those claimants become sick in the future").
155 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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physical impairment 56 as a result of a medical condition to which ex-
posure to asbestos was a substantial contributing factor."1 57 Without
getting too far into medical terminology, such a prima facie showing
requires that a qualified physician perform a medical examination
that finds (1) a permanent respiratory impairment, (2) a diagnosis of
"asbestosis or diffuse pleural thickening," and (3) the asbestosis or dif-
fuse pleural thickening "is a substantial contributing factor" to the
physical impairment.1 58 Once these criteria are met, the injured indi-
vidual may bring a claim in court but must file with the original com-
plaint the evidence from the medical evaluation that constitutes the
prima facie evidence of impairment. 159 Future claimants would not
be able to bring a case until their injury manifests itself, but nor would
the future claimants be barred from bringing their claims at a later
time. The defendant companies would remain viable profit-making
entities if they no longer had to defend against thousands of claims,
many of which are baseless and brought by an overzealous plaintiffs'
bar.
The bill takes other measures to defend against the usual plain-
tiffs' bar tactics to get more favorable judgments. 160 First, a court may
consolidate into a single trial only the claims of those who consent.
161
Attorneys will not be able to bring in claims for those who have only
tenable claims and have expressed no real interest in the case. Sec-
ond, a case "may only be brought in the State of the plaintiff's domi-
cile or a State in which there occurred exposure to asbestos that is a
substantial contributing factor to the physical impairment."162 This
provision eliminates "forum shopping" by the plaintiffs' bar, which
156 The existence of a "physical impairment" will be determined by standards set
forth by the American Medical Association. S. 413 § 4(b)-(c).
157 Id. § 4(b)(1).
158 Id. § 4(b)(2).
159 Id. § 5(c). Requiring such a factual showing with the original complaint at first
glance seems to erode the "notice pleading" characteristic of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, but the plaintiff is not required to present evidence that would nor-
mally be discovered later in the litigation. Rather, the plaintiff is presenting only the
evidence that he has in his possession at this early stage-his own health. Thus, the
policy behind "notice pleading," allowing the plaintiff to bring a case without having
all the necessary facts to prove the case but rather only putting the defendant on
notice as to what the claim is, remains intact.
160 See generally Michelle J. White, Why the Asbestos Genie Won't Stay in the Bankruptcy
Bottle, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1319, 1330-32 (2002) (arguing that the number of asbestos
claims continues to grow despite the bankruptcy provisions in large part because as-
bestos litigation is profitable for the plaintiffs' bar).
161 S. 413 § 5(a).
162 Id. § 5(b) (1). The only exceptions to the venue provisions are for claims based
upon cancer or fatal mesothelioma. Id. § 5(b) (2) (A)-(B).
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knows which states are more plaintiff-friendly than others. 163 Third,
the bill is self-enforcing in that it allows any party to remove a case to
federal court if a state court "refuses or fails to apply" the rules under
the bill. Thus, the bill ensures that claimants will receive the prom-
ised protections no matter where the case is filed.
There are other advantages to the medical criteria approach. For
example, the bill protects future claimants with a statute of limita-
tions, which tolls "until the exposed person discovers, or through the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, that the ex-
posed person is physically impaired by an asbestos-related
nonmalignant condition. '164 Also, the bill protects companies from
excessive liability by the "two-disease rule," which states that a claim
"arising out of a nonmalignant condition" is a distinct cause of action
only when the same individual makes a claim arising out of asbestos-
related cancer. 165 No damages are allowed for the "fear or risk" of
cancer.1 66 Finally, the bill bans settlements for nonmalignant claims
that require releasing the defendant from future liability arising from
a claim for asbestos-related cancer.16
7
John W. Ames and Andrew D. Stosberg point out three criticisms
against the medical criteria approach, but ultimately these are not
persuasive. 168 One potential argument is the medical criteria is not
entirely objective and could be open to fraudulent and coached plain-
tiffs who feign poor lung capacity in breathing tests.169 Any medical
examination is subject to this criticism, and such fraud is part of the
reason behind this reform. Raising the bar for what must be proven
will at the very least lessen the fraud that occurs in asbestos cases. An-
other criticism is that more litigation will result from arguments about
163 See RAND REPORT, supra note 9, at 6 (stating that five states-Mississippi, New
York, West Virginia, Ohio, and Texas-handled sixty-six percent of all asbestos filings
between 1998 and 2000).
164 S. 413 § 6(a).
165 Id. § 6(b).
166 Id. The ban against "fear or risk" of cancer eliminates the concern that there
will be a new wave of asbestos claims arising out of a recent Supreme Court case that
held plaintiffs could seek compensation for fear of contracting cancer in the future.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 157-59 (2003) (finding for six retired
railroad employees who sued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which gov-
erns suits against railroads, for "fear of cancer"); see John W. Ames & Andrew D. Stos-
berg, Toxins Are Us: The Latest of Reform Efforts to Curtail Asbestos Tort Litigation, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2003, at 18, 60.
167 S. 413 § 6(c).




whether plaintiffs have met their prima facie burden.170 Ames and
Stosberg note that "[t]he evidentiary hearing for such a dispute may
be lengthy if it involves the analysis of medical tests, plaintiffs exhaus-
tive medical history and/or convoluted expert testimony from multi-
ple doctors."17 1 Although this criticism may be valid, the costs of filing
frivolous claims means that the claims are more likely to be meritori-
ous and such disputes are par for the course in injury cases. The bill's
placement of the dispute at the pleading stage means that less of the
court's time will be wasted because non-meritorious claims will be dis-
missed earlier. A third criticism of the "medical criteria" approach to
reform is that legitimate victims will be excluded from bringing a
case. 172 The argument in support of this criticism is unclear, but rais-
ing the bar for the proof that must be shown to bring a claim will
protect legitimate victims by ensuring the court system is not clogged
with illegitimate claims.
Ohio has already passed "medical criteria" legislation similar to
Nickles's bill. Ohio's reform legislation took effect on September 2,
2004, and the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court located in
Cleveland has "issued an administrative order requiring asbestos cases
filed by individuals showing symptoms of illness from exposure to as-
bestos to be the first cases heard. 1 73 The court also temporarily dis-
missed claims of those not showing signs of illness but who were
exposed to asbestos; the claims can be reinstated if illness later devel-
ops. 174 The court was eager to implement the new legislation because
of the severe backlog of cases in the county; there were 41,000 pend-
ing cases, 150 company defendants, and seven Ohio companies that
have declared bankruptcy to date.1 75 The Ohio law is currently facing
a state constitutional challenge to its retroactive provision, which re-
quires current claims to meet the established medical criteria.176 But




173 Ohio Court Moves Truly Sick to Head of Asbestos-Lawsuit Line, BEST'S INS. NEWS,
Sept. 24, 2004, at 2004 WL 85984435. The new law requires all pending claims to be
evaluated according to the new medical criteria. The evaluations are expected to take
four to six months. Id. This screening period should result in a net gain in terms of
waiting times for verdicts for plaintiffs who are truly sick; currently mass asbestos trials
can take more than a decade to complete.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Ohio Asbestos-Lawsuit Reform Faces Constitutional Challenge, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Aug.
23, 2004, at 2004 WL 85983826.
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lem-Senator Nickles's bill also applies retroactively. 177 Although the
medical criteria bill failed to get the needed votes to pass the Senate
in 2003, the success of the bill in alleviating backlog in Ohio and the
failure of other legislative approaches could persuade dissenters that
Senator Nickles's solution is the best.
The second legislative approach, the creation of a national trust
fund, has received more attention, but it is most likely too complex
and administratively cumbersome to be effective. The Fairness in As-
bestos Resolution Act, or FAIR Act, of 2004178 is sponsored by Senator
Hatch, and cosponsored primarily by Senator Frist.179 The FAIR Act
would channel all asbestos claims to the Asbestos Injury Claims Reso-
lution Fund,180 which would be overseen by a new administrative
agency created within the Department of Labor, the Office of Asbes-
tos Disease Compensation (Office).181 The Office would review
claims and distribute compensation from the trust on a no-fault ba-
sis 182 to those who have been injured by asbestos exposure.18 3 The
trust would be funded by asbestos defendants. Although a company's
fund contributions could not normally be excused by an automatic
stay in bankruptcy under the bill, a company could still file for bank-
ruptcy and use the trust and channeling mechanisms of § 524(g) and
(h) in some circumstances. Namely, a company that has had asbestos
expenditures less than one million dollars, or a company with expend-
itures over that amount if the order granting confirmation of such a
plan is made within nine months of the enactment of the FAIR Act,
may file for bankruptcy.18 4 These loopholes perpetuate the unconsti-
tutional treatment of future claimants.
177 Asbestos Claims Criteria and Compensation Act of 2003, S. 413, 108th Cong.
§ 4(b) (1) ("No person shall bring or maintain a civil action ... in the absence of a
prima facie showing of physical impairment.") (emphasis added).
178 S. 2290, 108th Cong.
179 The FAIR Act was first introduced in 2003 by Senator Hatch. FAIR Act of 2003,
S. 1125, 108th Cong.
180 S. 2290 §§ 221-224.
181 Id. § 101.
182 Id. § 112 ("An asbestos claimant shall not be required to demonstrate that the
asbestos-related injury . . . resulted from the negligence or other fault of any other
person.").
183 Id. § 101(a)(2).
184 Id. § 202(a) (3) (granting permission for companies with "prior asbestos ex-
penditures less than $1,000,000" to file bankruptcy and use § 52 4 (g) and (h)); Id.
§ 202(c) (granting the same permission for companies with expenditures over
$1,000,000 within nine months of enactment of the FAIR Act if the bankruptcy court
determines that confirmation of such a plan is necessary for reorganization, fair treat-
ment of all creditors and the company, and for the "balance of the equities").
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Negotiations have been ongoing between Senate Republicans
and Democrats to achieve bipartisan agreement regarding the trust
fund. A letter from Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist to the former
Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle illustrates the progress that
negotiations have made.18 5 The two party leaders have agreed on a
total fund amount of $140 billion.18 6 One obvious question regarding
whether the fund will meet its stated purpose of protecting the claims
of those who have yet to become sick will be whether $140 billion is a
sufficient amount. If the Fund becomes unable to pay claims, the
Act's sunset provision provides that the Act will terminate and un-
resolved claims must seek relief in civil court. 18 7 The Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the total cost for the FAIR Act
would be $123 billion.' 88 The AFL-CIO is unhappy with the $140 bil-
lion amount, however, because the Senate Judiciary Committee had
originally agreed on a $153 billion figure. 189 Senator Diane Feinstein
points out that the original cost approved by the Judiciary Committee
was in fact $108 billion with a forty-five billion dollar contingency re-
serve.' 90 Thus, the estimate by the CBO demonstrates that much of
the contingency reserve would be required, and perhaps the viability
of the Fund is rightly questioned.
The political parties have been unable to agree on two key points
identified by Senator Frist in his letter: (1) how the plan will be started
up, and (2) how pending claims will be handled.' 9 ' The first issue
regards how long the Fund will be allowed to start up before claims
will revert back to the courts. Former Senator Daschle would like a
ninety-day limit for the Fund to be operational and able to pay all
185 Letter from William H. Frist, U.S. Senate Majority Leader, to Tom Daschle,
U.S. Senate Democratic Leader (Sept. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Frist Letter], available at
http://namic.org/pdf/040927Asbestos-FristToDaschle.pdf; see also Letter from Tom
Daschle, U.S. Senate Democratic Leader, to William H. Frist, U.S. Senate Majority
Leader (Sept. 15, 2004) (demonstrating a "strong commitment to developing a bipar-
tisan solution to the asbestos crisis"), available at http://www.mesothel.com/pdf/frist
asbestosletter_- 9-15-04.pdf.
186 Frist Letter, supra note 185.
187 S. 2290 § 405(f)-(g).
188 Letter from Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to
Senator Don Nickles, Chairman, Committee on the Budget, U.S. Senate (Apr. 8,
2004) (revising an earlier estimate given for S. 2290's predecessor statute, S. 1125),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/53xx/doc5367/04-08-NicklesAsbestosLetter.
pdf.
189 Klaus Marre, AFL-CIO Opposed to Daschle's New Asbestos Compromise, THE HILL,
Sept. 16, 2004, at 5, available at http://www.hillnews.com/news/091604/asbestos.
aspx.
190 150 CONG. REc. S4131 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
191 Frist Letter, supra note 185.
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claims, a position favored by plaintiffs. 192 Senator Frist believes this
deadline is "unworkable." 193 Ninety days does seem like a short time
to get regulations implemented and any bureaucracy running. Tak-
ing thousands of claims out of the court system only to have them
returned after a ninety-day delay or having plaintiffs delay making
claims in court thinking they will be resolved by the Fund would cre-
ate an administrative mess.
Second, Congress must decide whether to take pending claims
out of the court system when the new legislation is passed. Senator
Frist proposes preserving only those claims in the system that have
"received a jury verdict or a full grant of summary judgment, but the
case is not yet final."194 Former Senator Daschle proposes making
more exceptions to the legislation and leaving all claims in trial,
mesothelioma claims with trial dates already set, and other claims
whose trial dates are set within a sixty-day window before or after the
legislation is enacted. 195 Senator Frist argues that making so many
exceptions will not solve the problem of unclogging the court system
because of the large number of currently pending cases and the long
duration of large consolidated asbestos cases. 196
Senator Frist makes a good point that grandfathering so many
current claims in the court system will mean that a significant part of
the problem as to which the new legislation is aimed will go unsolved.
As Senator Frist points out, "[c]laimants that meet our agreed upon
medical criteria would certainly find surer and quicker compensation
from the Fund before these trials are resolved-and those that do not
meet our agreed upon medical criteria should not be paid at all."'1 97
Further, allowing an exception for claims with trial dates will allow
plaintiffs' attorneys an opportunity to "beat the clock" and file claims
to avoid "the less lenient but more just medical criteria" that the new
legislation will establish.1 98 To address the concern that taking claims
that are near resolution after many years in court would be unfair,





196 Id. Senator Frist cites cases in Maryland and West Virginia as examples of cur-
rently pending mass consolidated cases with thousands of claims that will probably be





der in which their claims are considered by the Fund (after exigent
claims)." 199
The Senate Majority Leader concludes his letter by indicating his
willingness to continue negotiations if a solution was not reached this
past legislative period. 200 A final agreement was in fact not reached,
and the asbestos reform bill was not on the agenda for the remainder
of the 108th Congress's time.20 1 As Senator Frist noted, there are
many other problems that would have to be resolved, including "the
specific funding terms, funding guarantees, claim values, reversion,
FELA, subrogation, and medical screening."202 Also, special interests
have applied pressure on the Senate Majority Leader, and no side
seems particularly happy with the negotiations. 20 3 In addition to the
AFL-CIO, the Committee to Protect Mesothelioma Victims, the Asbes-
tos Disease Awareness Organization, and the Asbestos Victims Organi-
zation have all jointly stated that the $140 billion figure is
inadequate. 20 4 Further, the American Insurance Association has in-
sisted that insurer contributions to the fund should not exceed forty-
six billion dollars, but no agreement has been made regarding insurer
allocation.20 5 Due to the unresolved issues and the big special inter-
ests that have not been satisfied by the progress of negotiations, it is
unlikely that the trust fund approach is workable. A medical criteria





201 Susan Cornwell, Outlook Darkens for Asbestos Reform in U.S. Senate, Sept. 27, 2004
(stating that Senator Frist intended to end legislative work by October 8, 2004, to
allow time to campaign and listed "intelligence reform, spending bills, and other bills
already at the 'conference' level of negotiations between the Senate and House" as
priorities over asbestos reform), at http://www.mesothelioma-asbestos-help.com/9B
ASBESTOS-22MESO-04/News7.jsp.
202 Frist Letter, supra note 185.
203 Critics refer to the FAIR Act as the Asbestos Industry Bailout Bill. Paul Ham-
pel, Lack of Trust Poisons Efforts to Overhaul System, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Sept. 22,
2004, at Al.
204 Senate Leaders Continue Asbestos Talks, but Insurers Are Pessimistic, BEST'S INS.
NEWS, Sept. 20, 2004, at 2004 WL 85984364.
205 Id.
206 Frank Nutter, President of the Reinsurance Association of America, expressed
the sentiment that other options besides a trust should be explored at this point.
Nutter stated that "[a]fter nearly two years of a serious effort by all parties to achieve
asbestos reform through the vehicle of a trust fund, it's probably appropriate that we
... evaluate all options . . . [including, among others,] legislative medical criteria."
Mark A. Hofmann, Doubts Emerge as Asbestos Bill Fails, Bus. INS., May 17, 2004, at 1, 54.
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CONCLUSION
Because the procedural due process rights of demand-holders are
trampled when their future claims are effectively discharged without
the opportunity to "have their day in court," § 524(g) and (h) are
unconstitutional. Mabey and Gavrin argue that, even-if the due pro-
cess rights of the future claimants are not protected during reorgani-
zation, the due process rights of one group cannot trump the
substantive rights of the other creditors and interests. The normative
argument is that "[u]nder the tests of practicability and balancing,
procedural due process protections may not be permitted to defeat
the substantive rights of all other parties or substantially to waste the
distributable value of the estate through delay or otherwise." 20 7 How-
ever, Mabey and Gavrin incorrectly assume that the only mechanisms
to accomplish reorganization and simultaneously deal with demand-
holders are with channeling injunctions and trusts. The other, and
more constitutionally sound, option is to pressure Congress to deal
with satisfying demands through a legislative solution, such as requir-
ing claimants to establish a prima facie case by meeting more strin-
gent medical criteria.
The future claimants require some way to deal with their claims.
Waiting years and years for their cases to wind their way through the
courts, once their injuries manifest, is not a viable option because it
denies due process through delay. Observation of the procedures and
outcome in Manville's reorganization suggests the solution available
in § 52 4 (g) and (h) also violates due process. The Manville future
claimants were ultimately awarded ten percent of some arbitrary set-
tlement value because the Trust was so grossly under-funded. This
inequity resulted from normative problems embedded in the trust
and discharge approach. The notice Manville gave and the appoint-
ment of the future claims representative were inadequate to ensure a
meaningful opportunity to participate. It was also impossible for
Manville to estimate the number of claims and provide sufficient
funding for the Trust. The current solutions for the problem of how
to deal with future claimants are not sufficient to meet the require-
ments of due process.
The Due Process Clause requires notice and a chance to be
heard. Because they are not yet aware of their injuries, future claim-
ants have no interest in present litigation. But future claimants are
real people who will discover they have significant and tangible inju-
ries caused by asbestos exposure. These people will have medical bills
207 Mabey & Gavrin, supra note 66, at 783.
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and may suffer diminished quality of life or have years taken away
from them. The present system under the Code cannot guarantee
these future claimants their day in court or adequate representation
in currently pending cases. Section 52 4 (g) and (h), which requires
notice and a legal representative, inherently cannot meet the require-
ments of the Due Process Clause in regards to future claimants and is
therefore unconstitutional. The most simple and viable solution is to
devise a system for weeding out the baseless asbestos claims currently
clogging the court system. With no remedy available in the Code and
the courts flooded with cases, the asbestos litigation crisis will remain
unsolved until Congress comes to an agreement and provides a legis-
lative answer.
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